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 1 Introduction
Since Montgomery (1972) it has been well established both in the economic
literature and in the policy debate that the way pollution permits are issued
does not aﬀect eﬃciency. This ﬁnding has been widely used in the policy
debates about the carbon markets created under the Kyoto protocol, and the
EU Emission Trading Scheme that came into force in 2005 (see IEA, 2005,
or Ellerman et al., 2010). However, it is also well-known that this result
only holds in a static setting and in partial equilibrium. In fact, very few
studies have scrutinized the properties of a market for tradable permits in
dynamic general equilibrium. The exception is the stream of research led by
Bovenberg, Goulder and Parry on the double dividend issue (e.g. Bovenberg
and De Mooij, 1994, Parry et al. 1999, Goulder, 2002). In an overlapping
generation framework (OLG),1 Jouvet et al. (2005) showed that decentral-
ization of the optimal path can be obtained with lump-sum transfers only
if tradable permits are not given to the polluting ﬁrms for free. This result
contrasts with the standard OLG model (Allais 1947, Diamond 1965) with-
out environmental constraints where the optimal policy can be decentralized
with lump-sum transfers without any other conditions (on this issues, see De
La Croix and Michel, 2002). With an environmental externality, free permits
act as a subsidy that increases the return to the owners of the ﬁrm’s capital,
which leads to a major distortion in the economy.
Despite the fact that the research mentioned above, by using general
equilibrium models, suggest that auctioned permits or emission fees dominate
the market in tradable permits with free endowment in terms of welfare, free
allocation (via grandfathering) remains the main policy option in practice.
This is true for the US SO2 market, the EU-ETS market, and also under the
Kyoto protocol.2
Stavins (1998) explored the motives that lead policy makers to favor free
allocation rather than auction, which we will call acceptability. We follow
Stavins (1998) and Goulder (2002) by deﬁning acceptability as the property
that environmental regulation does not reduce a ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Clearly, if
such a policy is possible, both the polluters (the ﬁrms) and the polluted
(the consumer) will agree on the proposed policy. As explained by Stavins,
1Solow (1986) points out that intergenerational issues must be analyzed within an over-
lapping generations model which takes into account intra- and inter-generation relations.
2However, it must be noticed that political discussions on the third phase of the EU-
ETS market led to an increase in the proportion of auctioning.
2existing ﬁrms favor freely allocated tradable permits because they convey
rents (known in the literature as windfall proﬁts) to them. These windfall
proﬁts create a distortion in the capital allocation among ﬁrms by increasing
the total capital return, since extra proﬁts are given to the shareholders.
Furthermore, emission permits also create entry barriers since newcomers
have to purchase permits from the existing ﬁrms (Koutstaal, 1997). The
economic literature shows that optimality cannot be reached because it will
be rejected by the polluters (here, the ﬁrms) if all the permits are auctioned.
Thus, optimality and acceptability remain conﬂicting issues.
In this paper we question this result. By developing a two-sector overlap-
ping generations model3 we show that the optimal path can be decentralized
while satisfying the acceptability condition that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are not re-
duced. We provide the policy rule for that. Dynamic issues relating to the
environment have long been the subject of economic analysis, especially in
the framework of optimal growth models. In this framework, ﬁrms share-
holders are well identiﬁed and capital accumulation can be fully studied.
This is particularly important since we are interested in the eﬀect of permit
allocation on the optimal growth conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the setting is presented.
The optimal growth problem is laid out in Section 3, where we explicitly
identify the conditions for optimal growth. In Section 4, we deﬁne a dy-
namic general equilibrium with pollution permits and show why giving free
permits to the polluters cannot lead to optimal growth. In Section 5 we ex-
plore alternative policy solutions, and suggest a way in which optimal growth
and acceptability can be reconciled. Acceptability suggests giving pollution
permits for free, but optimality requires them to be fully auctioned, or an
emission tax to be levied. Can the two policy options be reconciled? In
section 6, we study the long run eﬀects of such policies. The last section is
the conclusion.
2 The model
We model a two-sector economy. The ﬁrst sector produces a good (energy,
for instance) by using capital and labor and by emitting a global pollutant
(carbon dioxide). The second sector produces a ﬁnal good by using capital
and labor, plus energy as an intermediate good. Although the ﬁnal good
3Originally introduced by Galor (1992).
3sector uses the energy supplied by the power sector, it does not directly emit
polluting emissions but, it still has an indirect eﬀect on pollution through its
energy demand to the power sector. The power sector is indexed by e and
the ﬁnal good sector by g. Households consume the ﬁnal good and energy,
and their utility level is impacted by the quality of the environment.
2.1 Power and ﬁnal good sector technologies
The output Y
g
t of the ﬁnal good sector occurs in each period according to a
production function F g(.) of capital, K
g
t , labor, L
g








t,Z t)( 1 )
The power generation sector produces an output Y e
t with a production func-
tion F e(.) by using capital, Ke
t, labor, Le








t,E t)( 2 )
Both production functions are homogenous of degree one and diﬀerentiable.
The power supply Y e
t will be used both as an intermediary input for the
ﬁnal-good sector and as a ﬁnal good for consumers.
2.2 Pollution dynamics
Let us consider a stock pollutant whose dynamics at time t, Pt, are given by
Pt =( 1− h)Pt−1 + m(Et)( 3 )
where h is the natural level of pollution absorption, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1, Et is the ﬂow
of pollutant resulting from economic activity and m(.) is the contribution
of this ﬂow to the stock. The transition from Et to m(Et) represents the
fact that only a fraction of Et may contribute to the ﬂow. For example,
only 95 p.c. of the ﬂow of greenhouse gases stays in the atmosphere. With
the function m(.) we accept that this proportion is not necessarily linearly
related to the ﬂow. Naturally we assume that mE ≥ 0.4
4An extension of this speciﬁcation would be to consider abatement as an argument
in the function m(.). In such a case, the ﬂow of emissions, net of abatement, that goes
into the polluting stock would be m(E,X), with mX < 0. Such a speciﬁcation would
not change the properties of our model. It would just introduce some more ﬂexibility, for
42.3 Households preferences
We consider an overlapping generation model with two consumption goods
(the ﬁnal good and power) and a pollution level. Individuals live for two
periods. The number of agents born at date t, Nt, is exogenous. Each agent
young in period t, supplies inelastically one unit of labor in period t. He or
she derives utility from the consumption of the two goods during the two
periods - i.e. c
g
t and ce
t in period t and d
g
t+1 and de
t+1 when old. The pollution
stock negatively aﬀects utility during the two periods of life - i.e. Pt and Pt+1.










t+1,P t+1)( 4 )
The function U(.) is strictly concave, increasing with respect to the two
consumption goods, and decreasing with respect to pollution, twice continu-
ously diﬀerentiable and it satisﬁes the Inada conditions.
3 Optimal growth approach
Optimal growth is a time path of the economy that maximizes the welfare of
all agents over all generations. In this section we ﬁrst present the resource
constraints of the economy and the optimal growth problem, and then the op-
timal arbitrage conditions that characterize this solution. The mathematical
derivations are relegated to the Appendix.
3.1 The optimal growth problem
The ﬁnal good sector uses capital K
g
t ,l a b o rL
g
t and energy Zt as produc-
tive inputs and delivers its output to the young and old households’ capital












t + Kt+1 (5)
where Kt+1 is the total capital stock in the economy in the next period.
In the power sector, capital Ke
t, labor Le
t and emissions Et serve as pro-
ductive inputs, and the output is used both as a ﬁnal consumption good (in
example if X were a policy instrument.
5both young and old age) and as an intermediate consumption good in the












t + Zt (6)
We assume total depreciation of the capital stock at each period of time.












We can now formulate the optimal growth problem. Let the discount
factor be γ,0<γ<1, and U(.) represent the utility function as given
by Equation (4). The optimal growth problem consists of maximizing the
discounted utility given the initial value of the capital and pollution stocks
(K0, P−1), the past values for consumption for the ﬁrst old, and subject to
the resource constraints presented just above (Equations (5) to (8)) and to
the dynamics of pollution accumulation given by Equation (3). The controls










t, emissions Et, and the intermediate consumption Zt. Formally the













The resolution of the problem is presented in the Appendix.
3.2 Optimal arbitrage conditions
The shadow prices associated with the physical capital stocks and the pollu-
tion stock can be eliminated from the ﬁrst-order conditions. By rearranging
the terms, the trade-oﬀs faced by the central planner at the optimal solu-
tion can be explicitly written down. The three conditions, C.1, C.2 and C.3
(below) represent the necessary conditions for optimal growth.

































































Condition C.1 corresponds to the optimal capital and labor allocation be-
tween the two sectors. This condition implies that the ratio of the marginal
productivity of capital and labor must be equal to the productivity of the in-
termediate good in the ﬁnal sector. Condition C.2 corresponds to the optimal
consumption of the ﬁnal good and the intermediate good in an individuals
life-cycle. The intertemporal consumption of ﬁnal good is determined by the
marginal productivity of capital in this sector and the intertemporal con-
sumption of energy depends on the marginal productivity variation of the
intermediate good. Condition C.3 corresponds to the optimal division of
consumption between the ﬁnal good and the intermediate good within a pe-
riod. The ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption are proportional to
the marginal productivity of the intermediate good in the ﬁnal sector.
Indeed, all the conditions imply a proportionality with the marginal pro-
ductivity of the intermediate good in the ﬁnal sector. This comes from the
fact that the intermediate good is the only direct link between the two sec-

















































This synthetic condition stresses the proportionality between capital alloca-
tion, labor, ﬁrst and second period consumption, intertemporal consumption
and the marginal productivity of intermediate good in the ﬁnal sector. If one
7of these conditions does not hold then the equilibrium is suboptimal.
4 Pollution regulation with pollution permits
Let us now turn to the dynamic general equilibrium of the economy. All
markets are assumed to be competitive. The output of the ﬁnal good sector
is the numeraire and the energy price is denoted by pe
t. In this section we shall
ﬁrst describe the behavior of agents (the government, households, and ﬁrms)
and then the general intertemporal equilibrium of the economy. Comparing
the equilibrium solution when pollution is regulated with tradable permits
with the optimal growth solution will yield our ﬁrst result.
4.1 The government
The government is endowed with two policy instruments. It can regulate
pollution with a market for tradable emission permits, and it can manage
transfers among households. Let us explain the functioning of these policy
instruments.
Pollution is regulated by means of a market for tradable emission permits
` a la Montgomery (1972). An amount of emission permits is issued to each
ﬁrm by the regulator, each permit allowing for a unitary emission level. Then,
ﬁrms are allowed to trade these permits among themselves on a market. It
is assumed throughout this paper that the government issues a number of
permits Et that coincides with the global optimal pollution level, Et = E￿
t.
In order to be as general as possible we consider that two issuing methods





t ≤ Et) are allocated for free to the polluting ﬁrms, and the remainder,
Et − E
e
t, are auctioned. The price of a pollution permit is denoted by qt.
As in any OLG model the government can also organize lump-sum trans-
fers to households, with τt being associated with the young agent and θt
with the old agent. Considering the second welfare theorem, in the standard
OLG model (without externalities) these transfers allow the government to
achieve any Pareto-optimal allocation (see Atkinson and Sandomo, 1980,
Sala-i-Martin, 1996, or De La Croix and Michel, 2002).
The governmental budget constraint then reads as follows,
Ntτt + Nt−1θt = qt(Et − E
e
t)( 1 3 )
84.2 Households consumption and savings
Households take the environmental quality as given. At the ﬁrst period of
life, the young agent earns the wage wt and receives a transfer τt which may




t, and saves st. Thus, the ﬁrst period budget constraint is,






t + st (14)
When old, after retirement, the agent receives a transfer θt+1 in addition to
any return on savings, Ωt+1st, where Ωt+1 is the return factor on savings.











t+1 =Ω t+1st + θt+1 (15)
The representative household maximizes its utility (4) by choosing consump-
tion subject to the budget constraints (14) and (15). Given prices and pol-




























Relations (16) and (17) give the trade-oﬀs between the consumption of the
ﬁnal good and energy. Relation (18) gives the trade-oﬀ between consumption
over the agent’s life cycle.
4.3 Representative ﬁrms behaviour
Like Galor (1992), we consider a representative ﬁrm in each sector, operating




t, are given by t − 1 savings decisions. We assume that capital
fully depreciates after one period.5 The ﬁrms take prices wt, pe
t and qt as
5The qualitative nature of our results would not be altered by the assumption of partial
depreciation.
9given and maximize their net revenue.
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g
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t is the proﬁt. From the Euler equation, this is equal to the marginal









In the power sector, by taking Ke
t and E
e


















































Proﬁts per unit of capital represent the return on investment that is
given to the shareholder, i.e. the owner of the capital stock. In our model,
the owner of the capital stock is the household when old. These ﬁrst-order
conditions show that the capital return in the power sector is determined
not only by the marginal productivity of capital, but also by the market
value of the free endowment of pollution permits given to the ﬁrm (the free
endowment valued at the market price of emission permits). This last term
represents the so-called windfall proﬁt (for a discussion about windfall proﬁts,
see e.g. Verbruggen, 2008).
The very existence of a windfall proﬁt can alternatively be shown by
considering a ﬁrm which maximizes the following proﬁt function, where an




















t stands for market capital return. The ﬁrst-order condition for






t. By using the Euler
condition the windfall proﬁt of qtE
e
t is obtained explicitly.
It can also be seen that, if all the permits were auctioned instead of being
allocated for free, then regulation with tradable emission permits would be
strictly equivalent to regulation with an emission fee. On the other hand,
a simple command-and-control regulation would not generate such windfall
proﬁt. So the debate is not only about quantity versus price regulation,
it is also about the assignment of the property rights on the pollution to
economic agents. With free emission permits, the rent is given to the ﬁrms,
which distort the capital market. This adverse eﬀect would not appear with
price or command-and-control regulations.
The fact that capital return in the power sector depends on both the
marginal productivity of capital and on the market value of the free endow-
ment of pollution permits deserves some more attention. One way, antici-
pating somewhat the equilibrium analysis that will be conducted in the next
section, is to understand the microeconomic rational of the capital supplier
in the presence of a free endowment of permits. In our model capital is
supplied by the agents in their old age. The amount of saving supplied st
comes from the ﬁrst-order condition (18). Given that the agent’s objective
is to maximize the return to savings by allocating it optimally between the
two productive sectors, this problem can be formulated as a portfolio prob-
lem. Let us denote by αt the proportion of savings invested in the ﬁnal good
sector, (1 − αt) being the share invested in the power sector. In a portfolio
approach the agent’s problem consists of maximizing the capital return for



















Meeting the ﬁrst-order condition for this problem at time t directly yields

















which corresponds to relation (23) with equality between the two sector cap-
ital returns (as we will see in the next section).
114.4 Intertemporal general equilibrium
The intertemporal equilibrium is deﬁned for a given sequence of government
decisions {τt, θt, Et, E
e
t} satisfying the government budget constraint given
by Equation (13). It is a sequence of prices {pe

















t }, Pt and Kt+1, satisfying all the equilibrium conditions. Households
maximize their utility and each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt. A necessary con-
dition for equilibrium in the capital market is the equality of capital returns
between the two sectors, Ω
g
t =Ω e




t = Kt = Nt−1st−1. All markets (labor, capital, pollution
permits, energy and ﬁnal good) clear. The dynamical equation for the envi-
ronment holds. The ﬁrst old agent, born at time t − 1, satisﬁes the budget













and the initial capital stock K0 = Ns−1 is given. We can now explicitly
deﬁne the equilibrium of the economy when labor and capital are perfectly
mobile across sectors.
Deﬁnition 1 Intertemporal general equilibrium
For a given policy {Et,E
e
t,τ t,θ t}t≥0 an equilibrium is deﬁned by
- a sequence of prices {qt,p e
t,w t}t≥0 and capital returns {Ωt}t≥0,







Relations (14) to (18), and d
g
0 and de
0 satisfying Relation (24),










{Pt}t≥0 and {Kt+1}t≥0 satisfying Equations (19) to (23),
such that, ∀t ≥ 0, the following equilibrium conditions hold:
- the government budget (13) is balanced,
- the capital stock Kt = K
g
t + Ke
































- the dynamics of pollution follow Equation (3).
We are now equipped to state the ﬁrst result of this paper, which is that
giving free emission permits to the polluting ﬁrms prevents the economy from
following an optimal growth path.
Proposition 1 For any policy {Et,E
e




and qt > 0, ∀t ≥ 0, optimality Condition C.1 is not satisﬁed in equilibrium.























































which departs from the optimality Condition C.1.
It appears that allocating free permits is equivalent to increasing the
capital return in the polluting sector. This sector then becomes artiﬁcially
more productive than the ﬁnal good sector, thus attracting more capital
than it should from a social optimum standpoint. This also characterizes an
equilibrium ` a la Hahn and Solow (1997) in terms of gross operating surplus.
Note, however, that, in equilibrium, the pollution level matches the optimal
one, because the number of permits issued by the government is optimal by
assumption.
It is interesting to notice that, in equilibrium, the two other optimality
Conditions, C.2 and C.3, are met. This can be checked for the trade-oﬀ be-
tween consumption over the life cycle (Condition C.2) by combining Relation
(18), ﬁrms optimization conditions, and the equilibrium condition on capital
























which corresponds to the optimality condition. It is straightforward to see
that the trade-oﬀs between the consumption of the two goods (Condition

































Hence, Proposition 1 shows that giving permits for free to the polluting
ﬁrms does not allow pollution to be regulated optimally, even though the
market for tradable permits itself works ﬁne. Even though this idea is well-
established in the literature (see the Introduction, above), the theoretical
rational for it is far from straightforward. In our setting it clearly appears
that free-permit endowment generates some windfall proﬁts to polluters that
distort the capital market, yielding too much capital accumulation in the
polluting sector. This is the dynamic general equilibrium setting that allows
this property to be highlighted.
Before demonstrating how to restore optimality the following lemma is
required. It shows that, provided an adequate public policy is in place, the
optimal path is an equilibrium.










t,Z t,E t,P t,K t+1}t≥0 is an
equilibrium with public decisions Et = E￿









t − Ωtst, where pe
t =1 /F
g












and st = Kt+1/Nt.
This lemma corresponds to the second fundamental theorem of welfare
economics. Proving this lemma is straightforward. It is suﬃcient to check
that all intertemporal equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed. Then, any path
satisfying the resource constraints of the economy and the optimality Con-
ditions C.1, C.2 and C.3 is an equilibrium.
145 How to restore optimality conditions
Let us consider that, as throughout the paper, the government manages pol-
luting emissions with tradable pollution permits, and let us also assume that
some of these may be give for free (for example on grounds of acceptabil-
ity). The question raised in this section is whether it is possible to ﬁnd an
allocation rule of permits such that optimality conditions are fulﬁlled. Our
purpose is to ask whether such a rule exists even when some permits are
given for free.
5.1 No free permits
The ﬁrst way to restore optimality Conditions C.1, C.2 and C.3 appears nat-
urally from Proposition 1. It simply consists of not giving free permits to
the polluters. This is what Proposition 2 states:
Proposition 2 A policy (Et,E
e
t,τ t,θ t)t≥0 such that Et = E∗
t and qt > 0
replicates the optimal solution in intertemporal equilibrium if E
e
t =0 , ∀t ≥ 0.



























coincides with the optimality condition C.1 if E
e
t =0 .
In other words, permits should be fully auctioned and not allocated for
free to the polluting ﬁrms. As soon as some free permits are given out, albeit
even a small proportion, the whole economy departs from the optimal path.
This result conﬁrms, in the more general setting of a two-sector economy
and with general speciﬁcations, the result of Jouvet et al. (2005). The fact
that the market for permits has an impact on the whole economy through
intermediate consumption in the ﬁnal-good sector does not alter this result.
The next subsection proposes another solution, where regulation policy
allows that, on grounds of acceptability, some of the pollution permits must
be issued for free.
155.2 Pollution permits for all
The sectoral dimension of our model allows us to investigate another solution
for restoring the optimality condition in capital allocation. If the aim is to
ensure equal capital returns in both productive sectors, then it is immediately
obvious that giving permits to both sectors would solve the problem. Let us
denote by E
g
t the number of free permits that are given to ﬁrms in the
ﬁnal-good sector. We assume that the total endowment of permits in the





t ≤ Et = E∗
t, ∀t ≥ 0, is allocated free of charge. This second solution
ﬂows directly from the proof of Proposition 1 and it is expressed in the
following lemma.























Proof. The general equilibrium with free permits E
g
t > 0 and E
e
t > 0


























































This lemma shows that, by giving a suﬃcient number of free permits
to all ﬁrms, dynamics conditions on capital allocation among sectors can
be restored. Because the ﬁnal good sector does not pollute, giving it some
pollution permits is equivalent to giving it a lump-sum transfer. Importantly,
this transfer is valued at the market price of tradable permits in equilibrium,
which coincides with the optimal pollution price because the emission cap
is equal to the socially optimal emission level. It can easily be checked that
equilibrium does not depend on the proportion of permits that are given for
free.
This sharing rule is a dynamic one. The balance between the two sectors
must be determined in each time period such that the lump-sum transfer is
similar in terms of capital units.
16The fact that polluting permits are given to ﬁrms which do not pollute
may seem somewhat puzzling. Actually, this is less paradoxical than it seems
at ﬁrst sight. The rational for such a measure is twofold:
1. cost pass through: the ﬁnal good sector bears a cost because the power
sector increases its output price when the price of carbon increases in
the market for tradable permits; so some compensation should be given
to these ﬁrms;
2. fairness: if a lump sum is to be given to some ﬁrms, which increases
their market value (the power sector), then it should also be given to
all other ﬁrms in the economy.
5.3 Restoring optimal growth
Lemma 2 states that optimality Condition C1 can be restored, which was
not the case when permits were given only to the polluting ﬁrms. Under
the allocation rule given in Lemma 2, given the equality of capital returns,



































with the households’ trade-oﬀ between the two goods (16) and (17), and
ﬁrms’ optimization Conditions (19), (20) and (21). Condition C.3 also holds.
This ensures that Relation (12) is also true. Then, we obtain the optimal
proportion of consumption, and we only have to restore the optimal level
of consumptions, which can be done with adequate transfers between young
and old at each time period. This result is summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Using Lemmas 1 and 2, optimal growth can be replicated in
equilibrium, provided an adequate ﬁscal policy, τt and θt.
5.4 Long-term equilibrium analysis
It is interesting to explore how the equilibrium is aﬀected by the allocation
of permits. We shall conduct this analysis on the long-term steady-state
equilibrium. As a starting point we compute the optimal solution at the
steady state and consider a regime with no free permits. In this case, it is well
17known that environmental regulation with pollution permits is equivalent to
regulation with a tax on emission. At the steady state, the output in the
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e + Z (29)













K = Kg + Ke,N = Lg + Le
Solving this problem leads to Conditions similar to C.1, C.2 and C.3, where
F
g






deﬁnes the optimal emission level). Then, consumption levels for the two
goods are given by Ucg = Udg = Uce/F
g










Therefore, at the optimal steady state all marginal utilities of consumption
are equalized. Without an endowment of free permits the golden rule could
be reached in a decentralized way by introducing a stock of pollution permits











18Let us now examine the two alternative solutions. First, we consider
the case where pollution permits, E
e
, are given to the power sector free of
charge. As explained above, this generates a windfall proﬁt and increases the
return on capital, Ω = F
g
ZF e
Ke + q E
e
Ke. Because of the optimality conditions






ˆ Ke. So there is a distortion in capital allocation between the
two sectors. This distortion leads to more capital in the power sector than in
the ﬁnal-good sector at equilibrium, ˆ Ke >K ￿e. In order to keep F
g
ˆ Kg = 1, the
capital stock is larger than what it would be under the golden rule, and thus
the life-cycle consumption level is lower. Moreover, the optimal arbitrage




Ke < 1. Therefore, there is no lump-sum transfer rule
between old and young that could restore the golden rule.
Let us now turn to the case where free permits are allocated to both





We already know that, under this rule, all optimal trade-oﬀs are satisﬁed (in
particular the equality of marginal productivity between the two sectors,
F
g
˜ Kg = F
g
ZF e
˜ Ke, and the equality of marginal utilities of consumption goods).
In this case, the trouble comes from the fact that there is an excess capital
accumulation, because F
g
˜ Kg = F
g
ZF e
˜ Ke < 1. The main diﬀerence with the
previous case is that the distortion caused by the free-permit allocation is
now symmetric between the sectors. What needs to be corrected is the over-
accumulation of capital. A standard implication of optimality condition is
that a steady state with over-accumulation of capital is not Pareto-optimal in
terms of consumption level. At least one date, it is possible to increase total
consumption by reducing the capital stock without reducing consumption at
any other date. Samuelson (1975) showed that lump-sum transfers can lead
a stationary economy to the golden rule. In our case, the steady state is
larger than the golden rule, which indicates over-accumulation. Thus, the
optimal transfer is a positive one to the older household. With this kind of
transfer, the golden rule can be restored. Therefore, giving permits to all
productive sectors, with transfers among households, induces an increase in
consumption, and thus an increase in proﬁts in the ﬁnal-good sector.
196 Back to acceptability
The question of the impact of such a policy on the proﬁts of the polluting
sector remains open. This is the subject of this ﬁnal section. Proposition
3 (above) shows that it is possible to restore optimal growth even when
free emission permits are given for issued, provided the endowment follows
the policy rule given in Lemma 2. Still, Proposition 3 says nothing about
acceptability, understood in the sense of Stavins (1998). So the question of
whether or not acceptability and optimality can be reconciled remains open.
This is the empirical question we want to address in this section.
Let us ﬁrst come back return to the policy rule of in Lemma 2. It is clear
that giving some permits for free to the polluters opens the door to possible
compensations recompense for abatement eﬀorts, and thus for a non-decrease
to a maintenance of in proﬁts. On that basis, it is easy to see that there may
exist some policy conﬁgurations in which both acceptability and optimality
could be met.
Let us now consider the most generous case where the government issues
all permits for free of charge (thus, giving up renouncing the possibility to of
raising some revenue through an auction). We assume that the endowments
follow the rule provided in Lemma 2. The polluting sector is thus endowed
with a windfall proﬁt given by of qtE
e
t. Still, the polluting sector then will buy
all the permits that have been given to the non-polluting sector, i.e. qtE
g
t.




t . Then it is obvious that the windfall proﬁt provided to the
power sector will exactly compensate for the number of permits the power
sector will have to purchase from the ﬁnal-good sector. So purchasing the
permits will be ﬁnanced by the windfall proﬁt. Nevertheless, because the
emission cap is binding, the power sector still bears an abatement cost. So
its proﬁt level will be reduced by the environmental regulation.7
This rationale can be used in the following way. Assume that the actual
size of the polluting sector is large enough for its purchase of permits from the
non-polluting sector to be small in comparison with its abatement cost, net of
the windfall proﬁt. The polluting sector will then experience a proﬁt increase
with the environmental regulation. Thus, Stavins’ acceptability criterion will
7Providing the polluting sector with more permits than its pollution level would create
’hot air’, but it would imply that the emission cap in the ﬁnal good sector is more stringent,
because we assume that the global emission cap is the optimal one. So, such a scenario
would not change the story.
20be met.
The condition of a large polluting sector in comparison with the non-
polluting sector seems to be met in the EU-ETS carbon market. The carbon-
emitters sector is much larger than the non-emitters. Non-emitters are es-
sentially only the residential sector using only electricity. All other economic
sectors (agriculture, industry, transport) emit some carbon. So, in prac-
tice, it would probably not be too diﬃcult to cope with the problem of the
capital-market distortion raised by Proposition 1.
The issue of the accompanying ﬁscal policy also deserves to be discussed.
Restoring optimal growth requires an adequate ﬁscal policy in terms of θ and
τ. To restore the optimal arbitrage between consumption and savings the
government can levy a tax on savings and redistribute it to the young, or
organize transfers among households. Realistically, this means that the cap-
ital returns associated with the windfall proﬁts are redistributed optimally
among the households. It must be noted that what is taxed is not the wind-
fall proﬁt itself but its return in the capital market. This also means that,
depending on the optimality criteria used, the redistribution rule leading to
optimal values for τt and θt, may vary. An important policy implication of
this result is that tradable emission permits (issued free of charge) should
not be considered as substitutes for ﬁscal policies as is usually the case in
the literature.8 Free permits might issued on the grounds of the Stavins’
acceptability argument that “ﬁrms should not be worse-oﬀ”, but permits
must be accompanied by an adequate ﬁscal policy on factor income. In other
words, quantity- and price-based regulation should be combined in order to
reach optimal growth and political acceptability. They are complements, not
substitutes.
7 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to question the idea that political acceptabil-
ity and optimality are conﬂicting goals in the ﬁeld of pollution control. We
have modeled a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium economy in which a
global pollutant is regulated with tradable emission permits, some of which
are allocated free if charge for the sake of acceptability. Our main results
are that optimal growth can be replicated even when some permits are given
8See the voluminous debate in environmental economics on quantity vs. price regulation
initiated by Weitzman (1974).
21for free, but this requires two conditions: (i) permits must be given to all
ﬁrms following a given sharing rule (provided in the paper), and (ii) the
windfall proﬁts must be redistributed among agents using an adequate ﬁs-
cal policy. This ﬁrst result shows that quantity-based regulation and price
regulation are best used in concert, not as substitutes. Second, acceptability
` a la Stavins (1998) can be combined with optimal growth if the polluting
sector is substantially larger than the non-polluting sector. In this case, the
windfall proﬁts given to the polluters will be large enough to compensate
for the pollution abatement costs and for the purchase of permits from the
non-polluting sector.
8 Appendix: The optimal growth problem
The optimal growth problem presented in Section 3.1 will be solved in this
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The ﬁrst-order conditions associated to with that the problem are the fol-
lowing:
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ment, and similarly for F e
Et and mEt. The arbitrage conditions for capital

























The dynamics of the shadow prices are obtained by diﬀerentiating the La-




























tKt+1 + µtPt)=0 .
These FOCs are used to derive the optimal arbitrage conditions discussed
in Section 3.2. Condition C.1 (optimal allocation of production factors allo-
cation) is obtained from the ratio λ
g
t/λe
t. Condition C.2( t r a d e - o ﬀ sb e t w e e n
consumptions over the life cycle) comes from the dynamic equation of λe
t.
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